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Economic  instruments  that  promise  “win-win”  solutions  for both  biodiversity  conservation  and  human
livelihoods  have  become  increasingly  popular  over  recent  years.  There  however  remains  a  gap in
terms  of  practical  and  policy-relevant  guidance  about  appropriate  approaches  that  take  into  account
the  local  needs  and  the  speciﬁc  cultural,  legal,  and  ecological  context  in  which  such  instruments  are
being  developed  and  applied.  This  paper  presents  a step-by-step  framework  that  helps  conservation
and  development  planners  and practitioners  to  identify  economic  instruments  that  can promote  pro-
conservation  behaviour  in  a speciﬁc  setting.  The  concept  of  ‘ecosystem  service  opportunities’  builds  on,conomic instruments
ssessment framework
and brings  together,  general  economic  principles  and  an  ecosystem  services  perspective.  The  framework
was  designed  to also  address  a number  of concerns  regarding  economic  approaches  in  order  to  help
practitioners  recognise  the  potentials  and  limits  of  economic  approaches  to nature  conservation.  The
framework  is  illustrated  by  its application  within  the  realm  of  a biodiversity  conservation  project  in
thor
Thailand.
© 2016  The  Au
. Introduction
The last decades have witnessed the increasing integration of
conomic tools and approaches into nature conservation efforts (De
root, Alkemade, Braat, Hein, & Willemen, 2010; Mace, 2014). At
he level of international policy, this development can be traced
ack to an explicit concern about economic incentives and ﬁnanc-
ng mechanisms within the UN Conference on Environment and
evelopment of 1992, and the “Rio Conventions” that came out
f it (see e.g. OECD, 1996). More recently, via the Strategic Plan
or Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets,
nternational conservation policy has formally requested national
overnments to apply economic instruments (UNEP-WCMC &
EEP, 2012). The demand from international policy together with
ublications showcasing successful implementation of economic
nstruments (e.g., TEEB, 2010, 2011) have created high expectations
hat economic concepts and policy instruments can help improve
he status of biodiversity and ecosystems and combine positive
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617-1381/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access artic
.0/).s.  Published  by  Elsevier  GmbH.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
conservation outcomes with enhanced economic and social pros-
perity (Balmford et al., 2002).
A large amount of academic research has been carried out on
economic instruments for nature conservation. Taxes or subsi-
dies to steer behaviour and reduce negative external effects have
a long history in environmental policy research (Pigou, 1920).
Many other economic instruments to create economic incentives
and pricing mechanisms that stimulate the protection of biodiver-
sity and enhance the provision of ecosystem services have been
studied (e.g., conservation easements, resource use fees, tradable
permits, offsetting schemes) (Pirard, 2012; Schröter-Schlaack &
Ring, 2011). An important impetus for economic approaches to
nature conservation was achieved via the “ecosystem services-
human wellbeing” nexus (Boyd & Banzhaf, 2007; De Groot, Wilson,
& Boumans, 2002; Fisher et al., 2008) that was made popular by the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA,  2005). The TEEB (2010)
initiative showcased and promoted a broad range of economic
instruments for ‘capturing’ the value of biodiversity and ecosystem
services. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are a particularly
prominent instrument for protecting biodiversity and ecosystem
services (Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013; Wunder, Engel, & Pagiola,
2008).
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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And yet, at practical policy and management levels, the call
or more economic instruments for the conservation of ecosys-
ems and biodiversity has resulted in some confusion. Conservation
nd development planners often struggle to understand whether
nd how such instruments can be used to tackle environmental
egradation and to improve the effectiveness, equity and sustain-
bility of conservation efforts, and the terminology surrounding
hem is frequently misunderstood. One particular common exam-
le from our experience is the way in which the process of economic
aluation and the use of economic policy instruments are often
onﬂated. Concerning instruments, an increasing body of reviews
e.g., Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010; Samii, Lisiecki, Kulkarni,
aler, & Chavis, 2014) and guidance documents (e.g., Greiber,
009; Morrison & Aubrey, 2010) have emerged for the design of
ES schemes. Yet, although PES schemes can take many forms
Jack, Kousky, & Sims, 2008), they do not cover the full range of
conomic instruments and are not always feasible or the most
ppropriate approach. Broader categorizations of instruments are
vailable in academic contributions, but they are less frequently
argeted at practitioners. In addition, practitioners lack guidance
or taking account of the concerns and limitations discussed in the
cademic debate. Academic scholars have argued against an over-
onﬁdence in “win-win” solutions and PES as panacea (Muradian
t al., 2013). Some raise concerns due to the multiple and complex
onditions for economic instruments to actually work in speciﬁc
ocio-cultural and legal contexts (Lockie, 2013; Vatn, 2010; Van
ecken, Bastiaensen, & Huybrechs, 2015), others even doubt their
eneral (long-term) effectiveness for nature conservation (Büscher,
012; McCauley, 2006; Redford & Adams, 2009; Spash, 2008). Yet
he academic debates often use framings that are too general,
ormats too complex, and language too academic, all of which ren-
er the resulting advice inaccessible to practitioners working on
mplementation efforts “on the ground”. These reasons may  partly
xplain why the integration of ecosystem service values into real-
orld decision making has not so far lived up to expectations (Daily
t al., 2009; Rodríguez-Labajos & Martínez-Alier, 2012).
This paper addresses the need for more practical guidance
or practitioners who seek to tap into the potential of economic
nstruments to enhance biodiversity and ecosystem services, at
he same time as improving human livelihoods. It presents a step-
y-step assessment framework with which to identify how (and
hich) economic instruments can be useful for enhancing conser-
ation and development goals in a speciﬁc context. The framework
tarts the screening for opportunities rather broadly, in particular
ot initially restricting the instrument selection to payments for
cosystem services (PES).
‘Ecosystem service opportunities’ (ESO) build on an ecosystem
ervice perspective and general economic principles for recog-
ising how economic instruments can inﬂuence incentives and
otivate actors to safeguard ecosystems. The opportunities are
ased on ﬁlling gaps and equalising imbalances between the groups
hich pay for the provision of ecosystem services and those which
eneﬁt from them, and on capturing untapped business oppor-
unities based on ecosystem services. ESO are the entry points
or choosing suitable economic instruments that modify people’s
ncentives and motivate them to act more sustainably and to safe-
uard ecosystems. This paper illustrates the application of the
ssessment framework with an example drawn from a conserva-
ion project in Thailand. The framework was designed to address
 number of concerns regarding economic approaches. The discus-
ion section of this paper highlights these and other key aspects
hat have been articulated in the academic debate and need to be
onveyed to practitioners.
The paper accompanies a comprehensive guideline document
or practitioners (Rode & Wittmer, 2015). While the guidelines are
ritten in language accessible to practitioners and provide illus-nservation 33 (2016) 35–47
trative examples as well as templates to support application, the
current paper is targeted at the academic community. It seeks to
clarify the theoretical basis of the framework, and place it in the
context of the current academic debate. It also aims to raise interest
of conservation practitioners to apply the framework in the ﬁeld.
2. Method
2.1. Origin and scope of the assessment framework
The assessment framework was  developed within the EU funded
project ‘Enhancing the Economics of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services in Thailand’ (ECO-BEST). It was  constructed by distilling
lessons from our experience as academic partners and advisors
who provide guidance regarding the use of economics for conserva-
tion and development policy and management, and by extracting
the essence of the academic debates. A crucial step in the effort to
develop such a framework was  to determine critical aspects which
should be conveyed to practitioners regarding the use of economic
instruments. These aspects are described in the discussion section
of the paper.
The framework can be applied either when there is a clear
intention to implement economic instruments (as in the ECO-BEST
project), or as a scoping exercise for understanding the extent
to which (additional) economic instruments could be useful in a
particular setting. In this case the results may  serve as basis for
a funding proposal to enable a design and implementation pro-
cess. In other instances, practitioners may  already have a speciﬁc
instrument in mind. In that case it might be useful to conﬁrm
or complement the initial ideas with the help of this assess-
ment framework. Although the framework guides users through
the assessment process along a sequence of tasks, the complex-
ity involved in real-world settings will require a certain degree
of interpretation and synthesizing. Ideally, the questions raised
in the different tasks are answered together with stakeholders as
part of an inclusive process for identifying opportunities to use
economic instruments at local level. The accompanying guidelines
for practitioners (Rode & Wittmer, 2015) provide more detailed
explanation and support tools for working through the framework
and for addressing practical challenges such as communication and
stakeholder engagement.
2.2. The assessment framework
The assessment framework consists of a sequence of tasks that
provide the structure for identifying the ‘ecosystem service oppor-
tunities’ in a speciﬁc local context (tasks 1–5) and for screening
adequate economic instruments that can motivate actors to engage
in more sustainable practices and nature conservation (task 6).
Fig. 1 summarizes the six tasks and contains the questions to be
addressed within each task. The following subsections explain the
content of the tasks and provide general examples. The results sec-
tion presents an example of application. It also shows how the
results of the different tasks can be structured within a single tem-
plate (Table 2).
2.2.1. Task 1: analysing how ecosystem services relate to the
management issues
The ﬁrst task is to clarify which issues or questions are of primary
concern to stakeholders and to understand how they are linked
to ecosystem services. Conservation managers (and stakeholders)
could be interested, for instance, in decreasing or halting over-
exploitation of resources (ﬁsh, timber, non-timber forest products
(NTFP), etc.), mitigating current problems with water regulation
and provision (ﬂoods or droughts), decreasing habitat loss or
improving habitat connectivity, supporting sustainable agricultural
J. Rode et al. / Journal for Nature Conservation 33 (2016) 35–47 37
Fig. 1. The framework for identifying opportunities to use economic instruments.
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ractices, or reducing pollution and its health impacts. At the same
ime, important ecosystem services provided by nature in the area
hould be assessed and related to the issues at stake. The common
ategorization (see e.g., CICES, 2015; MA,  2005; TEEB, 2011) as pro-
isioning (such as food, water and raw materials), regulating (such
s maintaining the quality of air and soil, stabilising the climate,
roviding ﬂood and disease control, or pollinating crops), cultural
from recreation to spiritual inspiration and mental health), and
upporting services (such as providing habitat) can be useful. In
iscussion with stakeholders, however, we recommend starting
ith the broad question of why local nature and ecosystems are
mportant and to whom, and then to narrow down and prioritise
he aspects that seem particularly relevant, using culturally mean-
ngful terms. To understand the relevance of different ecosystem
ervices in the local context, it is important to understand trade-offs
n the provision of different services, as well as synergies. A typical
rade-off occurs when an increase in food provision through inten-
ive agriculture means a decrease in biodiversity and the provision
f other services (e.g. pollination or soil protection). The process of
eﬁning the relevant issues and the role of ecosystem services can
erve as a forum for stakeholders to learn about, discuss and nego-
iate the socio-economic and biophysical conditions within which
hey operate, and which they seek to change.
.2.2. Task 2: determining providers, beneﬁciaries and degraders
f ecosystem services at stake
This task seeks to understand, map, and describe the relation-
hips between people and ecosystem services. It aims to assess how
takeholders relate to or interact with the relevant ecosystem ser-
ices, according to three types of role. ES providers are actors who
anage ecosystems or otherwise contribute to ES provision, e.g.
armers, foresters, or wetland managers. Although clearly nature is
he primary provider of ecosystem services, the ability of an ecosys-
em to generate important services depends to a large extent on
ow that ecosystem is managed, and whether it is actively pro-
ected from degradation. In some cases, it is not only important to
dentify current ES providers, but one should also consider possi-
le future providers, including those who have been providers in
he past and could take this role again. ES beneﬁciaries are those
ho beneﬁt from ecosystem services in some way  and therefore
ave a direct or indirect interest in their provision, or even crucially
epend on them for their livelihoods. Beneﬁts can occur locally,
or instance when the local population beneﬁts from clean water,
TFPs, erosion prevention, or the view of a beautiful landscape.
hey can also occur further away (e.g. a downstream municipal-
ty beneﬁting from ﬂood prevention, or a company beneﬁting from
lean and stable water ﬂow) and may  be felt on a national or global
cale (e.g. natural heritage, carbon sequestration) or by future gen-
rations. ES degraders damage ecosystem services or otherwise
ave a negative impact on their provision. ES degradation can be
aused by chemical pollution or extractive activities such as mining,
ut also by overuse of resources such as ﬁsh or timber.
Although in many cases ES providers, − beneﬁciaries and −
egraders are different (groups of) people, the same actor can
imultaneously be a provider and a beneﬁciary or even a degrader of
cosystem services. For example, consider a farmer in a watershed
rea who depends on insect pollination and pest control services
and so is a beneﬁciary), conserves the natural forest on part of his
and and grows crops (and so is a provider) while clearing primary
orest on another piece of land and allowing agrochemical runoff to
rain untreated into a nearby river (and so is a degrader). Similarly,
he same management practice might be seen as degrading in one
ontext and providing in another. For example, rewetting drained
eat land could be seen positively as preventing carbon release or
egatively as reducing soil fertility. The classiﬁcation of an actor asnservation 33 (2016) 35–47
beneﬁciary, provider or degrader determines the reference based
on which the distribution of rights and obligations can be discussed.
2.2.3. Task 3: assessing gaps in ecosystem service provision and
imbalances in costs and beneﬁts
This task uncovers gaps in ecosystem service provision and
imbalances in costs and beneﬁts of ecosystem service provision. By
a gap in ecosystem services we mean that demand for an ecosys-
tem service exceeds its current supply, i.e. at least one beneﬁciary
is interested in greater provision than at present. Imbalances occur
when one actor (or a group) pays for the provision of ecosystem
services and others beneﬁt from them without making any contri-
bution. An imbalance can also occur when an actor degrades the
ecosystem and others suffer as a result.
The framework ﬁrst analyses which ES providers bear the costs of
ecosystem stewardship by expending money or effort without any
recompense. An obvious example is the ﬁnancial cost of manag-
ing conservation areas such as national parks, but costs also occur
outside formally protected areas. Local communities or individu-
als may  pay for ecosystem management or maintenance (e.g. ﬁre
prevention measures for community forests, monitoring of sustain-
able ﬁsheries, etc.). In addition, ecosystem conservation frequently
requires people not to use a piece of land for proﬁt and to forego
beneﬁts (in economic terms: ‘opportunity costs’). Examples of prof-
itable activities include timber felling, cattle grazing, mono-crop
farming or resource extraction such as mining. In order to pro-
tect biodiversity and maintain ecosystem service provision, local
landholders need to refrain from these or at least restrict them,
for instance by having fewer livestock, using sustainable farming
practices instead of mono-cropping. Such opportunity costs are
equivalent to real costs for the local land user, because they mean
the loss of potential income.
With respect to ES beneﬁciaries, the relevant questions are:
Which ES beneﬁciaries receive beneﬁts for free, and which beneﬁcia-
ries are interested in more ES provision? For instance, a large and
proﬁtable brewery may  obtain a stable ﬂow of clean water for
free, which in turn depends on sound farming practices or other
aspects of good watershed management upstream. A famous hotel
reaps large proﬁts as a high-end tourist destination partly due to
the scenic beauty of a national park area, but does not contribute
towards the costs of park management. A pharmaceutical company
engages in proﬁtable bio-prospecting activities in a large tropi-
cal forest area (i.e. the discovery and commercialisation of new
products based in biological resources), but does not participate
in conservation efforts. Or, consider divers and snorkelers who
enjoy the coral reefs of a coastal protected area, but do not pay for
their management. All these examples are characterized by imbal-
ances in the sense that beneﬁciaries receive beneﬁts for free while
providers bear the costs. A gap in the current provision of ecosys-
tem services may  arise, for instance, when a hydropower company
wishes to reduce the sedimentation rate in the river, or farmers or
residents near a river may  wish to stabilise the water ﬂow to reduce
the risk of ﬂood and drought. In these cases the ES beneﬁciaries may
be interested in supporting efforts to increase their provision.
Finally: Which ES degraders are not held liable for the harm they are
causing and why? Some impact on ecosystem services (in economic
terms: ‘negative externality’) may  already be regulated, such as the
effect on water quality of pollution or pesticide use. Yet the degra-
dation of many ecosystem services is still disregarded in law or in
economic policies. Negative externalities which are ignored may
include coastal erosion (e.g. by cutting down mangrove forests);
river bank erosion; downstream sedimentation; changes in water
regulation or micro-climate (e.g. when replacing agroforestry sys-
tems with monocultures); or a decrease in carbon sequestration
(typically by deforestation). The harm to aesthetic or spiritual val-
ues (i.e. cultural ecosystem services) is equally often neglected. The
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ask is to understand and outline which negative impacts on ecosys-
em services are currently not formally or informally regulated. On
hat basis one can decide whether it is appropriate and feasible to
old ES degraders liable for the harm they are causing.
.2.4. Task 4: identifying ecosystem service opportunities
This task identiﬁes the opportunities to inﬂuence incentives
nd motivate actors to safeguard ecosystems. It distinguishes four
road types of opportunities, three of which directly link a speciﬁc
takeholder role (ES provider, ES beneﬁciary, ES degrader) to gen-
ral economic principles, namely the principles of ‘Steward Earns’,
Beneﬁciary Pays’, and ‘Polluter Pays’. A fourth type concerns ‘Inno-
ation’, i.e., business opportunities based on ecosystem services,
hrough which local communities may  beneﬁt from conservation.
The Steward Earns principle involves rewarding ES providers or
ompensating them for the costs they incur in providing ecosystem
ervices. For example, landholders in the buffer zone of a protected
rea might refrain from certain land-use practices in order to main-
ain the natural habitat for endangered species, or assist in tree
lanting, patrolling and ﬁre management activities. Financing or
ewarding such conservation actions (whether direct management
osts or opportunity costs) can motivate providers to maintain or
ven enhance ES provision.
In the Beneﬁciary Pays principle, actors who beneﬁt or proﬁt from
cosystem services are asked to contribute to the costs of conser-
ation. Coming back to the previous examples, the beer or water
ottling company may  accept (or be obliged) to support watershed
anagement efforts in order to maintain or improve a stable ﬂow of
lean water. Some form of payment (ﬁnancial or other) for the ben-
ﬁts they derive from ecosystem services may  be asked from users
f coastal infrastructure and settlements that are protected from
torm damage by coral reefs and mangrove forests, or from hikers
nd mountaineers who enjoy the facilities of a scenic national park.
oreover, beneﬁciaries may  be willing to support an increased
rovision of ecosystem services useful to them.
In the Polluter Pays principle, ES degraders are held liable and
sked to compensate for the damage (‘negative externalities’) that
hey cause, or to stop their harmful activities. Examples include
enalising the pollution of a river that others use for ﬁshing or
or drinking water, or creating liability schemes for a sand-mining
ompany that causes erosion and downstream siltation. This is an
pportunity to generate funds to remedy or mitigate such dam-
ge, and to discourage actors from causing it in the ﬁrst place.
any regional or national compensation requirements and liability
egulations already apply this principle, mainly to corporate activ-
ties. But in the case of damage to ecosystem services there are still
pportunities for new and better economic instruments.
The last category of ecosystem service opportunity is based on
hat we call the Innovation principle. It comprises untapped busi-
ess opportunities based on ecosystem services, and possibilities
o access or create new markets and value-adding possibilities. The
im is to ﬁnd new ways to enhance beneﬁts to people while at the
ame time preserving biodiversity. Various types of green markets
nd green products are raising their proﬁle throughout the world
o add monetary value to conservation efforts, ranging from more
raditional products such as ecotourism or organic foodstuffs to
on-traditional markets in forest carbon, biodiversity offsets or for-
st bonds. Innovation can also focus on enhancing the efﬁciency and
cope of existing eco-markets and business opportunities, or par-
icipation in them. Examples include: developing REDD+ as a form
f carbon ﬁnancing that explicitly beneﬁts local communities and
rotected areas; providing necessary credit or training to enable
rotected area residents to invest in developing ecotourism facil-
ties and services; or negotiating premium prices and purchasers
or products that are sustainably produced. Such business oppor-
unities tend to need signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment or capacitynservation 33 (2016) 35–47 39
support. This is a challenge when entrepreneurs are local com-
munities without ﬁnancial resources or business expertise, and
economic and ﬁnancial instruments can clearly play an important
role.
2.2.5. Task 5: checking for appropriateness of ES opportunities
This task involves critical reﬂection on the appropriateness of
the opportunities, also considering factors outside the domain of
economics. Not every theoretical opportunity identiﬁed from an
economic perspective will be appropriate in practice or achievable
under existing conditions and endowments. The socio-cultural con-
text, including what is considered an appropriate distribution of
rights and obligations with respect to natural resources are critical
at this point, but also ethical aspects need to be considered. The
discussion section of this paper will come back to these aspects in
more detail. The framework reminds practitioners that for differ-
ent reasons it may  not be appropriate to reward ES provision, to
ask ES beneﬁciaries to contribute or ES degraders to compensate
for damage. Similarly, not all innovative business opportunities are
appropriate to pursue. Our experience in applying the framework
has shown that inappropriate or unfeasible opportunities (such as
asking people to pay for clean air, rewarding farmers for obeying
the law, selling access to sacred places, etc.) will not be considered
as opportunities in tasks 3 and 4 in the ﬁrst place. Nevertheless, the
following questions serve as an additional safeguard, and they can
also help to identify additional conditions or areas of support that
are required for a successful implementation of an opportunity:
• Will this opportunity generate net livelihood beneﬁts for those
concerned? Are there (undesired) side effects for other groups?
• Are possible sources of opposition understood and can they be
dealt with?
• Is this opportunity likely to have desirable ecological conse-
quences, considering all relevant aspects of biodiversity and
ecosystem services?
• Is this opportunity compatible with the legal and institutional
context?
• Is this opportunity appropriate according to ethical considera-
tions and within the socio-cultural setting?
• Is there a risk of undermining existing conservation measures,
e.g. informal community rules regulating resource use?
We recommend that these questions be discussed among a
broader team, including through consultation with key stakehold-
ers. Ultimately a decision needs to be made whether or not a
particular opportunity is appropriate and worth pursuing.
2.2.6. Task 6: coming up with ideas for economic instruments
At this point, suitable economic instruments can be selected.
Fig. 1 indicates congruence between the principles and potentially
suitable instruments. Table 1 gives an overview of widely-used
economic instruments that have been applied in biodiversity con-
servation and which stimulate local community involvement and
beneﬁt. The reference to the underlying principles helps to link
instruments to the opportunities that were identiﬁed in task 4.
It shows that economic instruments often combine several of the
economic principles. For instance, PES schemes usually combine
contributions from beneﬁciaries with an incentive mechanism for
providers of ecosystem services, and there is often a fund to channel
and redistribute the money. Developing and promoting an ecolog-
ical product often requires securing of start-up ﬁnancing.
It is important to keep in mind that new economic instruments
are typically most effective in combination with existing ones and
also with non-economic measures. Most of the time, there are
several sustainability challenges within the same area, and a combi-
nation of instruments are more likely to address them successfully
40
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of common policy instruments along economic principles.
Economic instrument Steward Earns Beneﬁciary Pays Polluter Pays Innovation How it works
User fees & surcharges Imposes fees or charges for the use or consumption of goods, services or activities associated with
the  natural environment. These may be used to generate revenue, recover costs and/or manage
demand. If the aim is to generate income, all or some of the fees are retained and reinvested in
conservation (or channelled to fund the people who manage the land, resources or facilities for
which charges are being made). Common examples of user fees include protected area entry fees;
parking, waste disposal and sanitation fees, timber royalties; ﬁshing, hunting and trophy fees;
other resource-harvesting fees (ﬁrewood, medicinal herbs, wild plants, etc.); bioprospecting fees,
charges for the use of tourist facilities (climbing, hiking, camping, etc.), restaurant, hotel and land
concessions and rental fees.
Payments for Ecosystem
Services (PES)
Landholders or resource managers are rewarded or compensated for managing land and resources
in  a way that generates speciﬁed ecosystem services. Payments are made by the beneﬁciaries of
ecosystem services, and may  be provided in cash or in kind (e.g. via monetary payments,
contributions of infrastructure, technical training, access to loans, etc.). PES are most frequently
made to regulating services such as water quality and supply, landscape enhancement,
biodiversity conservation and disaster risk reduction.
Carbon  payments A special form of PES which involves the sale of certiﬁed emissions reductions (carbon credits),
generated by undertaking land and resource uses which sequester carbon, or which avoid or
reduce carbon emissions. Carbon payments are particularly relevant for implementation of the UN
programme towards ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD + ).
Direct  payment (e.g.
conservation concessions
&  contracts,
compensation etc.)
People are provided with performance-based payments for undertaking agreed conservation
actions. These payments can occur within PES schemes, but they are often made by international
agencies, governments, companies or NGOs and not necessarily by the beneﬁciaries of the
ecosystem services. They typically focus on compensating the opportunity costs of foregoing a
particular land or resource use in order to secure conservation goals.
Insurance  schemes Insurance schemes compensate local people for cost or damages related to conservation (e.g.,
crops or livestock eaten by wildlife).
Voluntary donations and
corporate sponsorship
Individuals or companies interested in conservation, or who beneﬁt from ecosystem services, or
accept that they play a role in the degradation of ecosystems, voluntarily sponsor activities that
enhance biodiversity or channel funds to local communities.
Taxes Activities that use ecosystem services or run the risk of harming biodiversity and ecosystem
services are subject to ‘ecological’ tax or to relatively higher tax rates.
Tax  reliefs, subsidies The government supports products, technologies, investments and practices that minimise or
prevent environmental degradation, or contribute towards conservation goals by relatively lower
tax  rates, tax exemptions, or payments.
Ecological ﬁscal transfers Redistribute public revenue according to certain criteria, including conservation measures.
Payments compensate for the costs of conservation measures (including opportunity costs) and
reward the provision of public beneﬁts.
Beneﬁt/revenue-sharing A ﬂat fee or percentage of public revenues or private income streams generated from conservation
products and services are shared with local residents. The intention is to recognise that local
people play a key role in conserving the environment and enabling the revenue streams that are
generated by it, and to provide them with positive incentives and tangible beneﬁts to continue to
do  so.
Prizes, awards & other
recognition
Prizes, awards or other honours are used as a way of recognising and rewarding individuals,
groups or villages/towns which display particularly good environmental practices.
Fines,  penalties & legal
liabilities
People who overuse, harm, or pollute the environment are legally obliged to pay for the damage
they cause. The aim is to motivate individuals and companies to avoid or minimise environmental
impacts or, if damage is already done, to oblige the responsible party legally and ﬁnancially to
compensate for it.
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Tradeable quotas, rights &
permits
Sets overall or individual limits on the use, conversion or pollution of the environment. Resource
users, land developers or polluters who  wish to exceed their quota or right must buy permits from
others. The sellers of these permits are those who are not using their own  allocation, or who have
gained credits from conserving the resource or ecosystem service elsewhere.
Auctions & tenders Auctions are a mechanism to decide which landowners receive a contract that pays them to
change land use and carry out landscape conservation measures on their land. So several
landowners make competing propositions or bids for the price they ask to implement
conservation measures and a buyer (government or private) will decide which one to accept
(usually lowest price for comparable measures).
Biodiversity offsets,
habitat/mitigation
banking
Companies whose activities damage biodiversity or destroy natural habitats (e.g. agriculture,
forestry, oil and gas, mining, transport or construction) invest in biodiversity conservation
elsewhere in order to balance or compensate for damage. Biodiversity offsets are usually pursued
as  a ﬁnal step after on-site environmental harm has been reduced and alleviated as much as
possible. When a conservation bank (or ‘mitigation banking’) is established, a landowner who  acts
to  conserve the natural habitat is seen as making a deposit in the bank and receives credits.
Another landowner who wants to develop the habitat or otherwise impact on it must purchase a
credit from the bank.
Debt-for-nature swaps A portion of debt is forgiven in exchange for environmental conservation measures.
Deposits  & performance
bonds
Individuals or companies undertaking activities which threaten the environment or require some
form of mitigation, remediation or management plan are required to make a (usually refundable)
deposit of funds against the expenditure involved.
Green  products & markets
(alternative income &
employment sources)
Income streams are developed from products based on the sustainable use of land and natural
resources, which use environmentally-friendly production processes, or which replace
environmentally-damaging sources of income and employment. This may involve reforming
existing products and markets or establishing new ones. Common examples include wild
nature-based products (e.g. honey, fruits, natural cosmetics, handicrafts), domestication of wild
species (e.g. ﬂowers, medicinal plants, commercial species, or eco-tourism.
Certiﬁcation &
eco-labelling
Eco-labelling and certiﬁcation are voluntary trademarks awarded to products or services deemed
to  be environmentally sustainable. The idea is to enable them to charge a price premium and reach
new markets − thus providing an incentive for businesses to operate in a way compatible with
biodiversity conservation. Common examples include ﬁsheries, timber, eco-tourism, and organic
agriculture.
Credit  & loans Credit and loans or preferential terms and conditions are explicitly granted to green products and
enterprises, or may  stipulate certain environmental requirements in their terms of agreement.
Green  investment facilities
(conservation bonds,
green investment funds,
etc.)
These are larger-scale sources of credit and investment for green or biodiversity-based enterprises.
While most of these facilities operate on a commercial basis, some provide funding on preferential
or concessional terms. Bonds for instance are tradable capital market instruments issued by
sovereign governments, states, municipalities or corporate entities to raise upfront funds, backed
up by the promise to repay the investor the value of the bond plus periodic interest payments.
Land/resource
management & usage
rights
The allocation of clear, secure and enforceable use and/or management rights is often a
prerequisite for the implementation of economic instruments.
Environmental training &
education programmes
Training and education is often a prerequisite for the implementation of economic instruments.
For example, may  enable entrepreneurs and producers to take up new practices or technologies,
trigger behavioural change, or increase consumers’ awareness of the range of options open to
them and the positive beneﬁts of green products and practices.
Sources: UNEP (2004), Chambers and Toth (2005) Chapter 2, UNEP (2009), CFA (2008).
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Table 2
Identifying ecosystem service opportunities and suitable economic instruments in Bu Phram subdistrict (Prachin Buri province, Thailand).
Task  1:  Clarifying  relevant  issues  and  the  role  of  ES Issues:  Insufﬁcient  wildlife  corridor  between  Khao  Yai  and  Thap  Lan  National  Parks  due  to  utilized  land  surrounding  Highway  # 304  (both  NPs  part  of  UNESCO  World  Heritage  Site);  on  Thap  Lan  NP  side,  communities
feel insecure  due  to  lack  of  ofﬁcial  land  ownership  titles;  general  lack  of  cooperation  between  communities  and  NP  management;  illegal  harvesting  of  endemic  Lan  palm  leaves  in  the  forest  Ecosystem  services:  Provision
of agricultural  products,  erosion  prevention,  forest  services  (CO2  sequestration,  species  habitat  incl.  protected  Lan  palm  tree,  NTFP,  water  regulation);  water  provision  and  ﬁsheries  Trade-offs:  higher  and  stable  income
from agricultural  food  production  (using  chemical  fertiliser)  vs.  species  habitat,  erosion  prevention,  soil  degradation;  infrastructure  development  (roads,  resorts,  shopping  mall)  vs.  wildlife  corridor  improvement
Task 2:  Understanding  how  stakeholders  relate  to
ES
Villagers:  ES  providers:  those  farmers  who  let  palm  trees  or  other  trees  grow  on  their  land  or  practice  organic  (pesticide-free)  cultivation;  ES  beneﬁciaries:  all  villagers  using  food,  water,  Lan  palm  tree,  NTFP  and
beneﬁting from  micro-climate  and  water  regulation;  ES  degraders:  Tapioca  and  eucalyptus  mono  crop  farmers  who  use  excessive  pesticides,  sellers  of  products  based  on  illegal  forest  use  (palm  leaf  products,  tree  stump
carvings, sugarcane  planters);  illegal  wildlife  hunters/traders  Thap  Lan  NP  management:  ES  providers:  wildlife  and  forest  management  Local  conservation  NGOs:  ES  providers: wildlife  conservation  Community
professional organizations:  ES beneﬁciaries: harvesting  of  palm  trees,  herbs,  rubber  Private  Sector:  ES  providers: petrol  company  with  ﬁnancial  contributions  (CSR activities),  ES  beneﬁciaries: Tourism  agencies,
restaurants, resorts,  hotels  beneﬁt  from  scenery;  Lan  leave  handicrafts  enterprises,  local  drinking  water  producers,  “Kabinburi  304”  industry  downstream  beneﬁts  from  water  provision  and  recruits  labor  force;  ES
degraders: waste  water  pollution  and  land  conversion  by  resort  development  and  cows  breeders  Tourists  and  users  of  highway  304:  ES  beneﬁciaries:  wildlife  watching,  nature  trails,  scenery;  ES  degraders: road  kill  due
to speeding,  and  littering  along  the  road  Govt.  administration  (national  and  provincial):  ES  beneﬁciaries:  Irrigation,  tourism  National  and  global  citizens:  ES  beneﬁciaries:  biodiversity  heritage  conservation
Task 3:  Recognizing  gaps  and  imbalances.  Unrecovered  costs  of  ES  provision  or  potential  costs  for
more ES  provision:
• Maintenance  of  biodiversity  on  agricultural  land  is  higher
effort (harvesting  that  protects  trees,  less  pesticides),
• Farmers  on  Thap  Lan  side  fear  that  leaving  natural
vegetation recover  will  increases  risk  that  they  lose  land
use rights
• Local  authorities  and  communities  may  have  to  give  up
(part of)  infrastructure  development
Unpaid  ES  beneﬁts  or  interest  in more  ES
provision:
• Tourism  and  shop  operators  beneﬁt  from
scenery but  do  not  ﬁnancially  support
conservation;
• Community  association  for  Lan  palm  handicraft
does not  contribute  to  recovering  of  the  palm;
• “Verona  resort”  owner  has  prime  location
between  two  NPs  and  has  not  contributed  to
costs; has  an  interest  in  solving  conﬂicts
between  NP  and  communities;
• Downstream  industries  do  not  contribute  to
improve the  living  conditions  of  their  labor
force;
• Conservationists  are  interested  in  keeping
UNESCO  WHS  status  but  provide  little  support.
Uncompensated  ES  degradation:
• Tapioca  and  eucalyptus  farmers  are  not  held
liable for  impact  on  biodiversity,  soil,  water;
• Illegal  forest  users  and  poachers  are  rarely
caught and  punished;
•  Verona  resort  is  not held  liable  for  impacts  of
waste water,  exotic  species  introduction,  (e.g.
horticultures and  cows).
• Speeding  on  highway  304  that  leads to  animal
road kills  is  monitored,  but  rarely  punished.
Task 4:  Identifying  ES  opportunities  “Stewards  earns”  opportunities:
• Farmers  could  be  rewarded  (payments,  honor
certiﬁcates,  technical  assistance,  etc.)  for  organic  and
wildlife-friendly  agriculture  and  native  tree  restoration;
• Farmers  on  Thap  Lan  side  could  receive  security  that
native vegetation  recovery  will  not  lead  to  loss  of  land
use rights;
• Local  authorities  could  be  supported  in  their  efforts
towards sust.  dev.  by  provincial  and  national  authorities;
• NP  management  could  receive  additional  funds  for
restoration  via  beneﬁt-sharing  scheme.
“Beneﬁciary  pays”  opportunities:
• Local  tourism  and  shopping  operators  could
contribute to  grassland  and  palm  tree
restoration;
• Community  organization  for  Lan  palm
production  could  support  sustainable
harvesting  on  productive  land  and  enforce
non-use  of  Lan  trees  in  forest;
• “Verona  resort”  owner  could  contribute
ﬁnancially,  with  land  donation  (on  Khao  Yai
side), and  promote  “sustainable  business”  in
the area;
• Local  drinking  water  producers  could
contribute  ﬁnancially.
• National  and  international  conservation
organizations  could  provide  funds.
“Polluter  pays”  opportunities:
•  “Verona  resort”  owner  could  be  asked  to
reduce  and/or  compensate  for  his  impacts  (e.g.,
run-off from  stables)
•  Speeding  on  highway  304  and  road  kills  could
be pursued  and  punished.
Innovation  opportunities:
• Ecological  product  certiﬁcation;  new markets
for sustainable  Lan  products
• Nature-based  tourism  (wildlife  watching,  bike
tours,  homestays,  etc.)
• Educational  activities  (wildlife,  Lan  education
center)
Task 5:  Checking  the  appropriateness  to  pursue
the ES  opportunity
Unclear,  but  potentially  YES:  on  Thap  Lan  side  it  is  currently
difﬁcult to  pay  people  who  do  not  ofﬁcially  have  ownership
land title;  those  farmers  most  inclined  to  ecological
agriculture are  the  “newcomers”  whose  land  use  tenure  is
least secured.
YES  in  general,  but  acceptability  needs  to  be
checked  for each  group  of  beneﬁciaries  separately
NO,  with  legal  situation  little  chance  to  hold
“Verona owner”  liable  via  the  Environmental
Quality  Promotion  Act  1992,  it  is  more  promising
to  win  him  as  an  ally  for  partnership  in  green
tourism  etc.;  Punishment  for  speeding  subject  to
police, (collaborations  with  NP  authority  perhaps
in far  future)
YES,  but  requires  trust  in  authorities  by  the
farmers (rights  to  use  land),  investment  and
technical support  on  certiﬁcation  or  label
development and  operation,  and  wildlife  based
tourism  management.
Task 6:  Pre-selecting  suitable  economic
instruments
Due  to  the  overlapping  land  use  rights  situation,  an  umbrella  agreement  between  NP  authorities  and  the  communities  is  needed.  A  co-management  and  development  plan  as  legal  basis  seems  feasible  under  the
National Park  law  Act,  Article  19.  This  agreement  can  include  and  facilitate
• ofﬁcial  limited  right  to  harvest  lan  palm  leaves  on  farm  land
• zoning  and  mapping  of land  use  for  conservation  purposes
• support  for  development  and  beneﬁt  sharing  scheme
• new  markets  for  local  and  organic  products  (e.g.,organic  rice,  Lan  palm  products),  ecological  tourism  activities  (wildlife  watching,  waterfall  tours,  biking,  homestays,  etc.)  and  educational  activities;
• certiﬁcation  scheme  (eco-labelling)  and  selling  local  products  in  the  shopping  complex;
• incentives  for  sustainable  land  use  (according  to  zoning  −  e.g.,  grass  land  for  conservation  management,  mixed  cropping,  etc.)  in  form  of  money,  green  credits,  access  to  loans,  agric.  assistance,  insurance  scheme  for
damage from  wildlife
•  corporate  sponsorship  schemes  (CSR)  with  “Kabinburi  304”  industry  downstream
• ﬁnes  for  speeding  and  wildlife  road  kills  (later  stage,  subject  to  police  and  national  park  authorities)
ure Co
t
b
t
e
p
o
a
f
s
e
m
c
m
n
t
t
f
p
c
o
g
2
2
t
r
b
a
i
S
W
D
K
w
N
i
s
f
a
aJ. Rode et al. / Journal for Nat
han a single one. For instance, a voluntary scheme by which
eneﬁciaries support ecological land management or conserva-
ion actions can improve on the minimum requirements already
stablished by direct regulation (such as rules for land use within
rotected areas, limits to fertiliser use, legal restrictions on hunting
r logging, etc.). It may  provide additional bonuses for conservation
ctivities in buffer zones or other conservation areas.
For this task, it is also crucial to understand and evaluate the
unctioning of existing economic instruments. In some countries,
uch as in Thailand during the time of the ECO-BEST project,
ntrance or user fees were commonly used, but PES and co-
anagement schemes were relatively new ideas, whereas in other
ountries such as Costa Rica or Mexico a much broader set of instru-
ents were already common. In parallel to generating ideas about
ew economic instruments, Task 6 hence also involves analysing
he extent to which the identiﬁed ecosystem service opportuni-
ies can be captured by existing instruments, by improving their
unctioning or broadening their scope.
The assessment framework hence leads to a screening of
otentially suitable instruments. Proposing a speciﬁc design and
onducting a ﬁne grain feasibility analysis will be subsequent steps
n the way towards actual implementation of an instrument (for
uidance and reference to useful resources see Rode & Wittmer,
015).
.3. Application of the assessment framework: an example from
he ECO-BEST project in Thailand
ECO-BEST was a four-year project (2011–2015) to reduce ter-
estrial biodiversity loss in Thailand and South-East Asia for the
eneﬁt of local communities through the application of economic
pproaches. The project aimed to establish economic instruments
n three pilot sites in Thailand: Thadee Sub-River Basin (Nakhon
i Thammarat province); Pang-Ma-O community in the upper Ping
atershed (Chiang Mai  province); and Bu Phram sub-district (Na
ee district, Prachin Buri province) located within Dong-Phayayen-
hao-Yai (DPKY) Forest Complex. In Bu Phram, the main objective
as to ensure connectivity of the DPKY Forest Complex (UNESCO
atural World Heritage Site). This would be achieved by improv-
ng the ecological condition of the land along Highway 304, which
eparates Khao Yai and Thap Lan National Parks (see map  in Fig. 2).Table 2 presents the results of the application of the assessment
ramework in Bu Phram. Due to the unclear land tenure situation
nd the lack of trust and collaboration between park management
nd local communities, the project identiﬁed the need for a co-
Fig. 2. Location of Bu Phram snservation 33 (2016) 35–47 43
management agreement, within which more speciﬁc instruments
and beneﬁt-sharing schemes could be developed. These include the
promotion of wildlife watching and eco-tourism activities; mar-
kets for handicrafts made from native Lan palm leaves; certiﬁcation
schemes for organic agricultural products; ﬁnancial and other sup-
port for farmers who  restore grassland and let native tree species
grow back; and corporate sponsorship schemes from downstream
industries.
By early-2016, the instruments were still in a design and early
implementation phase. Thap Lan National Park (NP) and Bu Phram
Sub-district Administration Organization (SAO) had signed a co-
management agreement based on the 19th Article of the National
Park Act of 1961 with the goal to develop the Bu Phram region as
a community-based wildlife tourism destination. The Thap Lan NP
Park Advisory Committee (PAC) had ofﬁcially endorsed the estab-
lishment of a Conservation and Ecosystem Restoration Fund, and
the Department for National Parks (DNP) and the DPKY World Her-
itage Advisory Committee had agreed that in order to increase
recognition, the scope of the Fund should cover the whole DPKY
World Heritage, with Bu Phram as ﬁrst target area. The constitution
of a new DPKY-WH Association (DoKWHA) as ofﬁcial adminis-
trative body for the DPKY-WH Fund was drafted and submitted
to the DPKY-WH Advisory Committee. It is envisioned that funds
would be used to compensate land holders for individual commit-
ments to stop tapioca cultivation and return the land to natural
vegetation, restore or improve ecological conditions, under indi-
vidual agreements with DoKWHA, and that the DPKY-WH Advisory
Committee would function as monitoring body. Income for the
Fund was  agreed to come from several sources, including Thai and
international wildlife initiatives, Lan palm handicrafts enterprises,
and service providers who beneﬁt from eco-tourism in Bu Phram
(buses, restaurants, hotels, shops, etc.). Contributors would receive
wildlife conservation stickers and annual certiﬁcates. Participating
farmers would receive annual compensation during a 5 year period,
after which conditions are renegotiated.
3. Discussion: key aspects to be considered when
implementing economic instruments
Practical efforts to implement economic instruments in con-
servation and sustainable development planning face considerable
risks of failing, either because the measures chosen are not adopted
by the stakeholders in the ﬁrst place or because they do not
have the expected positive effect, that is, to actually promote the
desired nature conservation and development objectives. This sec-
ub-district in Thailand.
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ion highlights eight key aspects that are critical for improving the
ikelihood of successful implementation. They are addressed in the
cademic literature, but not always accessible to practitioners. The
roposed assessment framework aims to address and incorporate
hese aspects.
.1. Understanding motivations and incentive structures is
ritical for changing behaviour
A main message conveyed by this assessment framework is that
n order to change behaviour, practitioners considering to utilise
conomic approaches should think less about calculating precise
cosystem service values but rather about identifying ‘ecosystem
ervice opportunities’, that is, the extent to which motivations and
ncentive structures can be modiﬁed in order to change behaviour.
 wide array of methods exists to articulate the monetary value
f environmental goods and services (e.g., Christie, Fazey, Cooper,
yde, & Kenter, 2012; Costanza et al., 2014; Pearce, Markandya, &
arbier, 1989). There are many situations in which economic valu-
tion is important in inﬂuencing policy processes (Bateman, Mace,
ezzi, Atkinson, & Turner, 2011; Bateman et al., 2013; Pearce &
eccombe-Hett, 2000) or raising public awareness and support for
nvironmental protection. However, generating information about
cosystem service values, alone, rarely changes the behaviour of
ndividuals, corporations or communities (Daily et al., 2009; Fisher
t al., 2008; Honey-Rosés & Pendleton, 2013; Turner et al., 2003).
n most circumstances, the beneﬁts and costs of changes accrue to
ifferent parties in very different ways, and ultimately motivations
nd incentive structures have to be modiﬁed so that actors involved
ave an interest in changing their behaviour.
.2. Conservation interventions and instruments must make
conomic sense to those concerned
Conservation actions that involve changing behaviour usually
eed to be economically attractive for the actors who are expected
o adopt them: as a standalone activity and relative to alternative
unsustainable) land uses, technologies and management practices
Barbier, 1997; Emerton, 2014). Environmental planning has often
nderplayed or omitted altogether the issue of ensuring that pol-
cy interventions are attractive and feasible from the perspective
f those actors whose behaviour should be altered (Tisdell, 1996).
or example, there is a long history of unsuccessful interventions
esigned to encourage (or even demand) the adoption of sustain-
ble land management practices by farm households, mainly based
n coercive regulatory approaches (Jones, 2009). Many of these
ctions failed either to improve the farmers’ livelihood or to reverse
and degradation problems, because their design and selection did
ot take account of the need to be ﬁnancially viable at the farm level
Barungi & Maonga, 2011; Nakhumwa & Hassan, 2012), or did not
ufﬁciently consider the costs to farmers of undertaking sustainable
and management (Iiyama et al., 2010). An analysis of economic
iability of conservation instruments does not stop at comparing
he cash income and expenditures associated with different land
anagement options. Economic viability of a particular practice
r technology depends not only on positive monetary returns, but
lso upon other factors such as the timing, stability and certainty of
arnings, the risk involved, the input requirements of the enterprise
nd their availability and affordability, the alternative earnings and
pportunities that are diminished or foregone, preferences regard-
ng the type of product or output that is generated, and the actors’
wn tastes and aspirations (Emerton, 2014).nservation 33 (2016) 35–47
3.3. Involving stakeholders increases the likelihood of identifying
“real” opportunities
Stakeholder involvement makes it possible to understand
people’s motivations for current (unsustainable) behaviour and
resistance to change, reveals existing conﬂicts and collaborations,
and exposes related issues they are struggling with. Many stake-
holders are the providers, beneﬁciaries, or degraders of ecosystem
services that will be directly affected by the development of any
new economic instrument. Other stakeholders could provide crit-
ical support for implementation, for instance as intermediaries or
as representatives of government agencies or other institutions.
In addition, it may  be as critical to the overall success to procure
at least passive consent or acceptance from those who may ini-
tially oppose the initiative. A good understanding of stakeholders’
positions, interests and constraints is therefore essential for select-
ing and designing a workable new instrument. Stakeholders are
much more likely to accept a proposed policy if it alleviates or at
least addresses their constraints. Examples are: the recognition of
property rights as an important incentive in PES schemes (Lockie,
2013) or speciﬁc social conceptions, for instance when clearing
land is per se considered as progress (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen,
2010). Similarly, early piloting with particularly motivated stake-
holders to ﬁnd out what works or not − and for what reasons −
can help to ﬁne-tune the instrument and avoid painful learning
experiences or failure with a larger group. In addition, involving
stakeholders from the outset increases the legitimacy of the pro-
cess.
3.4. Applying economic instruments presupposes or implicitly
deﬁnes rights and obligations
A central question for an appropriate use of economic instru-
ments is whether the beneﬁciary of an ecosystem service has the
right to have free access (e.g., to clean water) and stable provision,
or whether it is the right of the land owner to freely choose his
actions, including to degrade an ecosystem service (e.g., to intensify
agriculture in a way that reduces groundwater quality). The distri-
bution of rights and obligations (of property, access, or use) is the
reference point for determining which economic principles to use.
For instance, adherents of economic thinking often propose paying
farmers to stop polluting water with pesticides or degrading bio-
diversity on their land. This is the logic behind many PES schemes:
a beneﬁciary of ecosystem services is asked to pay and money is
transferred to the providers. However, proposing such an economic
instrument supports the view that land owners may  act freely on
their own  property, even if it negatively affects other members of
society. Conversely, if the right of all people to clean air or water
was the priority, the land owner could be implicitly bound by a
‘duty to care’. Under the Polluter Pays principle he could be obliged
to stop or reduce pollution or else be held liable for it. Deﬁning such
rights and obligations is essentially a political and legal decision
(Jack et al., 2008; Lockie, 2013), reﬂecting perceptions of justice in
the socio-cultural context (Muradian et al., 2013; Ostrom, 1990).
If rights and obligations are already deﬁned (whether formally in
legal terms or informally within culturally accepted norms), then
proposals for new instruments that disregard them are likely to
face resistance and fail. On the other hand, if rights and obligations
are undeﬁned, the choice of economic principles and instruments
essentially deﬁnes them. In this case, groups that beneﬁt from the
current lack of regulation may  oppose the new instrument or there
may be concerns of setting a precedent in an as yet unregulated
ﬁeld.
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.5. Effective instrument design needs to consider ecosystem
ervice interdependencies
Ecosystems provide multiple services simultaneously that inter-
elate in complex dynamic ways (Bennett, Peterson, & Gordon,
009; Nelson et al., 2009; Rodríguez et al., 2006). Competition
etween different services occurs when the provision of one service
s enhanced at the cost of reducing the provision of another service.
ynergies arise when different services are enhanced simulta-
eously (Howe, Suich, Vira, & Mace, 2014; Raudsepp-Hearne,
eterson, & Bennett, 2010). For example, efforts in land manage-
ent to optimize a single ecosystem service (e.g. provisioning
ervices such as food, timber and ﬁbre) often result in a decline
f regulating and cultural services, such as ‘water quality and
uantity’ or ‘landscape aesthetic’, or in a decrease of biodiversity
Adams, 2014; Chan, Satterﬁeld, & Goldstein, 2012). It is a key
hallenge for efﬁcient policy design to identify what type of land
anagement positively inﬂuences ecosystem functioning and the
ustained provision of all relevant ecosystem services. Otherwise,
conomic instruments run the risk of focusing on beneﬁts for spe-
iﬁc groups while not sufﬁciently taking into account detrimental
ffects on others. This may  lead to (well-founded) resistance against
olicies or instruments. The prominent example of the leakages
nd externalities associated with international payments for reduc-
ng emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)
an serve as an illustration. REDD+ has emerged as a key interna-
ional strategy to halt land-use change in developing countries and
nvolve them in climate change mitigation efforts (Angelsen, 2009).
EDD+’s approach to reducing carbon emissions, however, has been
riticized for permitting the planting of commercial forests pro-
ided that the actors involved verify that any new forest contains at
east equal amounts of carbon as its predecessor. Although planting
ommercial forests may  balance carbon emissions, native forests
ffer various ecosystem services beyond carbon sequestration that
re important to different stakeholders (Hicks et al., 2014).
.6. Viable solutions usually involve a mix of economic with other
nstruments
‘Economic instruments’ are often distinguished from ‘direct
egulation’ (also referred to as ‘command and control’) and ‘infor-
ational measures’. These distinct types of policy instruments
ay  be able to respond to different challenges of ecosystem ser-
ice management (Schröter-Schlaack & Ring, 2011). Most of the
ime, multiple sustainability challenges within the same area are
ore likely to be successfully addressed with a mix  of instruments
ather than a single one (Barton, Blumentrath, & Rusch, 2013).
hereas direct regulations such as protected areas, public land
urchase, or prescription of land management standards play a cru-
ial role in safeguarding a minimum level of biodiversity (e.g., to
void the extinction of an endangered species or crossing critical
hresholds of ecosystem functioning), economic instruments merit
articular consideration for managing ecosystem services within
afe margins that do not endanger critical levels (Schröter-Schlaack
 Blumentrath, 2011) or for improving the performance of ‘direct
egulation’. For instance, they may  provide bonuses in buffer zones
r other areas targeted by special conservation efforts (Drechsler,
ätzold, Johst, & Shogren, 2010). Educational and informational
easures aimed at learning about and connecting with nature and
aising awareness about biodiversity and ecosystem service degra-
ation are often important complements to enhance the acceptance
f policies, or increase participation in voluntary conservation and
anagement measures. Taking stock of existing policies from dif-
erent sectors that are related to conservation (e.g. agriculture and
orestry, energy, transport or trade) may  also point to shortcomings
nd blind spots in the design of the current instruments (Doremus,nservation 33 (2016) 35–47 45
2003; Gunningham & Young, 1997; OECD, 2007). The compatibility
and synergies with existing policy measures need to be considered
already when screening economic instruments.
In addition, acting on ecosystem service opportunities often
requires arrangements of multiple instruments across different
scales. For instance, REDD+ payment schemes or international
‘green’ investment vehicles are linking global beneﬁciaries to local
providers via a cascade of measures and policies. Global beneﬁcia-
ries’ willingness to provide funds, and hence the overall viability of
the scheme, depends crucially on the extent to which safeguarding
procedures can alleviate potential risks that may occur at differ-
ent scales. This includes monitoring and enforcement activities to
ensure effective conservation at local level, credible reporting to
different audiences at higher scales, and transparent procedures
to rule out bribery and ineffective use of funds across scales. Local
authorities interested in these instruments need to be aware of
the scale-sensitivity and establish early on the link to higher level
initiatives and policy levels.
3.7. Selecting economic opportunities and instruments is also
about ethics
Practitioners often underestimate the extent to which the
application of economics to nature conservation involves ethical
dimensions. To begin with, the most common economic principles
are fundamentally rooted in considerations of distributive justice.
For instance, the ‘Polluter Pays’ principle aims at preventing any-
body from reaping beneﬁts at the expense of − or even despite
considerable harm to − other members of society. In a similar way,
having beneﬁciaries compensate providers for costs involved in
natural resource management (according to the ‘Beneﬁciary Pays’
and the ‘Steward Earns’ principles) can be considered a dictate of
fairness. But ethical aspects may  also call for caution in the applica-
tion of economics, particularly market-based instruments such as
emission trading or habitat offsetting (Gómez-Baggethun & Ruiz-
Pérez, 2011; Luck et al., 2012). Markets control access to goods and
services by deciding how much they will cost. This means that peo-
ple can only have what they can afford, as opposed to a system of
equal distribution or a policy of access according to need not pur-
chasing power (CBD, 2011; Corbera, Kosoy, & Martínez-Tuna, 2007;
Martínez-Alier, 2002; Sandel, 2012). Moreover, many people intu-
itively reject the use of economic terminology in relation to nature,
regarding beauty, wildness, sacredness, etc. as being outside the
economic domain in the same way  as love or friendship (Sandel,
2012). Taking ethical consideration seriously can help to construct
a broader set of values around nature (Doak, Bakker, Goldstein, &
Hale, 2014; Jax et al., 2013; O’Neill & Spash, 2000; O’Neill, Holland, &
Light, 2008) and to ease such reservations, but it is wise to anticipate
and understand possible opposition to economic approaches and to
select instruments which are workable in a speciﬁc socio-cultural
context.
3.8. Economic and non-economic motivations to protect
biodiversity have to be understood
People may  already protect nature and natural resources for
non-economic reasons labelled as ‘intrinsic motivations’ in the aca-
demic debate. Such motivations can reﬂect the different facets of
environmental values and relationships to nature, but are also often
related to existing (informal) community norms that govern a sus-
tainable use of natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). There is evidence
that depending on the context and the design of policy instruments,
economic framing and monetary incentives risk eroding people’s
intrinsic motivations. This can occur if economic motives become
more salient in people’s mind, or if informal community rules
no longer work in the presence of external regulation (Cardenas,
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tranlund, & Willis, 2000; Frey, 1992; Rode et al., 2015). In other
nstances intrinsic motivations can be enhanced by introducing
ncentives, for instance when they are perceived as recognition and
ppreciation (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010). In order to select
nd design effective economic instruments it is therefore essential
o understand existing motives to safeguard nature and ecosys-
em services, and to carefully assess how economic instruments
re likely to affect them.
. Conclusions
Conservation policy and the academic debate on this topic have
itnessed a paradigm shift with high hopes that applying eco-
omic instruments can enhance biodiversity conservation and local
ivelihood. So far however, this potential remains contested. We
et out from the assumption that indeed ‘win–win solutions’ that
an combine conservation and livelihoods beneﬁts may  not always
e found, but that it is worth looking for them. One hindrance
o capturing their potential may  be the lack of accessible and
ractical guidance for practitioners to adequately transcribe the
conomic concepts and ideas into a speciﬁc context. This article
ddresses the need for practical guidance. It presents a framework
hat assists conservation practitioners to identify the opportunities
here economic instruments can motivate actors to engage in more
ustainable practices and to conserve ecosystems. A more detailed
anual for applying the framework in the ﬁeld can be found in
ode and Wittmer (2015).
While our guidance on an assessment of ecosystem service
pportunities focuses on the local level, many measures for improv-
ng the status of ecosystems and local livelihood cannot be enacted
olely at the micro scale. This can be due to the fact that revenue
treams might have to come from the national or even international
evel, suitable policy instruments fall into the responsibility of
ational or provincial jurisdiction, or local-level innovations might
equire higher-level legal changes or institutional reforms. At the
ame time, socio-economic systems and ecosystem service linkages
ypically extend over multiple levels of scale. We  see three possi-
le ways in which the framework described in this paper can also
e useful at higher policy levels. First, it can serve as an important
eans of linking or crossing the boundaries between different lev-
ls of scale and stakeholder groups, and fostering common action
hich is based on shared interests and joint solutions to conser-
ation and development issues. Secondly, local assessments and
uccessful initiatives may  serve as ‘good practice’ examples that
elp broaden the debate on how society wants to manage its natural
esources and help provide a momentum for a wider sustainability
ransition. For example, if sufﬁcient local initiatives can adequately
onitor and ensure forest conservation or reforestation, institu-
ions at the national level may  apply for REDD+ payment schemes
nternationally. Third, changing economic incentives is decisive at
ll levels. Identifying opportunities to close gaps between potential
nhancers or providers of ecosystem services and their beneﬁcia-
ies can equally be pursued at regional or national levels. Against an
nderstanding of who beneﬁts from ecosystem services and how
ncentives can be changed to enhance their provision (or at least
revent their further deterioration) instruments can better target
onservation and livelihood goals. Assessments of ecosystems and
heir services as currently undertaken in many countries, such as for
xample the EU Member States, provide an important baseline for
uch an approach. Similarly there is scope for private enterprises
o apply the approach in order to identify opportunities to help
lose the gaps between provision and demand for ecosystem ser-
ices. This applies particularly to the development of new business
pportunities, but private enterprises can also function as interme-nservation 33 (2016) 35–47
diaries in setting up new instruments or support policy measures
via capacity building and training.
We  are therefore convinced that ‘ecosystem service opportu-
nity’ thinking can also help to stimulate a transformation within the
broader policy debate. This may  be an important complementary
strategy to the current national focus on valuing ecosystem ser-
vices for raising general awareness and including ecosystem service
values into accounting systems.
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